


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NARENDRA NATH LAW

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## Vyādi and Vājapyāyana

Vyādi and Vājapyāyana were two grammarians older than Kātyāyana, as shown by his reference to them in his *Vārttika*.<sup>1</sup> The former was the author of an extensive work called *Samgraha*, no longer extant,<sup>2</sup> which Patañjali mentions, and on which, as attested by long-established tradition, he based his 'great commentary' on Pāṇini. These two grammarians seem to have differed from each other in their views respecting certain important details. One of the differences was in regard to the import of words and is fairly well known. In fact, it is in pointing out this divergence that Kātyāyana mentions both of them. Many writers on Sanskrit grammar since have referred to this difference;<sup>3</sup> and it has also been noticed in modern works on the subject.<sup>4</sup> It is proposed here to refer to a second point of divergence between them which does not appear to be so well known now. But since it relates to the import of propositions or, more strictly, sentences, it is necessary to start by restating briefly the nature of the first difference, which concerns the meanings of words.

Students of modern Logic are familiar with the question as to whether terms are to be understood in extension or in intension. A

1 See *Vārttikas* 35 & 45 on Pāṇini, I, ii. 64. (Keilhorn's edition of the *Mahābhāṣya*, pp. 242, 244). For some interesting remarks on the probable date of Vyādi, see Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, pp. 209-11.

2 See Puṇyārāja's com. on *Vākya-pādiya*, ii. 484. From the way in which he introduces stanzas 267 & 268 of the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākya-pādiya*, one would conclude that they are taken from this work of Vyādi.

3 Cf. Helārāja on *Vākya-pādiya*, iii. 2, Puṇyārāja on *ib.*, ii. 155 and *Sarva-darśana-samgraha*, ch. xiii.

4 For example, in the *Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* by Dr. P. C. Chakravarti, p. 185.

controversy of a very much allied character, viz., whether words mean a *dravya* or *jāti* occupies an important place in ancient Indian works.<sup>5</sup> According to Vyāḍi, they signify *dravyas*, while according to Vājapyāyana they, including proper names, signify *jātis*.<sup>6</sup> It should, however, be carefully remembered that neither view excludes from the complete significance of words either of these two aspects of things. The question, as Patañjali points out,<sup>7</sup> is only which of the two aspects should bear more emphasis and which less. Those who maintain that the meaning is *dravya* imply that it is the primary sense of the word and that *jāti* is the subsidiary. Similarly those who hold that the meaning is *jāti* imply that that is the primary sense and that *dravya* is the subsidiary. By *jāti* is to be understood an essential quality which is common to two or more things. We may take it as equivalent to what is called a 'universal' in English. Some hold that this quality is only an abstraction, others regard it as objectively real; but this is a distinction which is not of consequence for us now. According to Vājapyāyana then, a word primarily stands for an attribute or *viśeṣaṇa*. The precise conception of *dravya*, which is the import of a word according to Vyāḍi, is more difficult to determine. But we shall, for the moment, take it in the sense in which it is commonly taken, viz. a *vyakti* or a particular instance of a class, say, a cow called Khaṇḍa or Śābaleya. That is, a word stands for the *viśeṣya* here and not for the *viśeṣaṇa* as in the previous view.<sup>8</sup>

5 Cf. *Nyāya-sūtra*, II. ii. 55-66 and *Mimāṃsā-sūtra*, I. iii. 30-6.

6 According to Pāṇini, the meaning may be either the one or the other. See *Maṇḍūkya*, vol i, p. 6: Kim punarākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ, āhosit dravyam? Ubbaya-mityāha.

7 Vol. i, p. 246: Na hyākṛti-padārthikasya dravyam na padārthaḥ, dravya-padārthikasya vākṛtir na padārthaḥ. Ubbayor ubhayam padārthaḥ. Kasyacit tu kimcit pradhāna-bhūtam kimcit guṇa-bhūtam. Ākṛti-padārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhāna-bhūtā dravyam guṇa-bhūtam; dravya-padārthikasya dravyam pradhāna-bhūta-mākṛtirguṇa-bhūtā. Cf. Śabara on *Mimāṃsā-sūtra*, I. iii. 33.

8 See Helārāja's com. on *Vākya-padiya*, III. ii. I.

It is natural to expect, from this divergence in their views about the meaning of words, that Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana differed in their views regarding the import of sentences also; and this is what Helārāja avers in the beginning of his commentary on the third chapter of the *Vākyā-paḍīya*.<sup>9</sup> The former, he says, took *bheda* as the import, while the latter took it as *sāmsarga*.<sup>10</sup> It should be observed that, as in the case of the meanings of words, neither thinker leaves out the other aspect of the import entirely in interpreting a sentence; only, in the view that holds *bheda* to be the import, *sāmsarga* is regarded as implicit in the sentence; and the reverse is taken to be true in the other view.<sup>11</sup> Now the use of the terms *bheda* and *sāmsarga* for the meaning of propositions is not at all uncommon in Indian philosophical literature. According to the interpretation ordinarily given of these terms in Advaitic works,<sup>12</sup> both refer to relations among the things signified by the various terms constituting a proposition; but they are applicable to different types of it. The first applies to propositions like *daṇḍena gām naya*, which present to the mind a manifold of inter-related things—the things being those that are denoted by the constituent words. The second applies to co-ordinate propositions<sup>13</sup> like *nilam utpalam*

9 See com. on iii. 5 (Benares edition, p. 11). From the manner in which Helārāja speaks, in more than one place, of this *kāṇḍa*, it is to be regarded not as a portion of the *Vākyā-paḍīya*, but as an Appendix to it. See pp. 54, 73, 76 of the Trivandrum edition of it.

10 We should note that this discussion has reference entirely to empirical usage. The ultimate import of a sentence according to Vaiyākaraṇas, including presumably Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana, is what is called *pratibhā*. Cf. Puṇyarāja on *Vākyā-paḍīya*, ii. 422 and Helārāja on iii. 5. (pp. 10-11).

11 See Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* on II. i. 1, *Vārttika* 2. (Benares edn. vol. ii, p. 13): *Tatra bhedaḥ sāmsargāvinābhāvituāt anumiyamāna-sāmsargaḥ sāmartyam, sāmsarge vā bhedaḥ vinābhāvyanumeya-bhedaḥ*.

12 Cf. Sureśvara's *Vārttika* on *Bṛ. Up.* p. 246, St. 902, *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* iii. 26 (Bombay Sanskrit Series) and *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 32 (Gackwad Oriental Series).

13 Cf. com. on *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, iii. 3: *Abhinna-vibhakti-nirḍiṣṭa* and not *bhinna-vibhakti-nirḍiṣṭa* as in the previous case.

which present to the mind a single thing, of which the qualifying features are indicated by the constituent words. The import here is thus an identity in difference. In the former case, the words not only retain the diversity of their meaning but also point to different objects; in the latter, the words, though they do not lose that diversity, point only to one object.

Now this interpretation will hardly hold in the present case<sup>14</sup> for, since it assumes that *bheda* and *samsarga* have reference to two distinct classes of sentences, they cannot form the basis for a difference of view between two thinkers. It is clear that, if it should constitute the basis of such a difference, each view must refer to *all* sentences or at least to *one and the same type* of them; and this is exactly what we find stated by Helārāja in the passage referred to above.<sup>15</sup> According to him, the import of a sentence is *bheda* in Vyāḍi's view and *samsarga* in Vājapyāyana's view. As explained there, *bheda* should be understood as equivalent to 'exclusion' or 'dissociation' and *samsarga* to 'inclusion' or 'association'. Now in Vyāḍi's view, as we know, the meaning of a word is *dravya*, and its main function is to distinguish the thing it means from all similar things. Thus a 'cow' means here not so much what is characterised by 'cowness' as what is distinguished from a 'horse' (say). When words with such function combine to form a sentence, they come to signify a thing not as possessing certain attributes but rather as excluding some. In Vājapyāyana's view, on the other hand, words signify qualities; and when such words combine to form a sentence, the import becomes inclusion or a combination of the qualities which they respectively connote.

14 Attention may, in this connection, be drawn to the present writer's note on the *Naishkarmya-siddhi*, iii. 2. (p. 255).

15 See Note 9. *Tatra Vyāḍi-mate bhedo vākyaarthah, padavācyānām dravyānām dravyāntara-nivṛtti-tātparyeṇa abhidheyatvāt. Jāti-vādinō Vājapyāyanasya tu mate samsargo vākyaarthah, sāmānyānām samśleṣa-mātra-rūpatvāt vākyaarthasya.*

We get a clearer explanation of the same in Pārthasārathi Miśra's commentary on the last section of the *Śloka-vārttika*,<sup>16</sup> which treats of the import of sentences. In discussing this topic, Kumārila introduces the terms *bheda* and *saṁsarga* as representing two of the views held in regard to it; and Pārthasārathi's explanation there may be translated as follows: "(In the sentence *gauḥ śuklaḥ*), according to those who hold that a word points to the universal, the first word connotes 'cowness' merely; and the second, which is syntactically related to it, signifies its association with the quality of 'whiteness'. Hence the import of the sentence is (stated to be) 'inclusion'. And as that (i.e. *saṁsarga*) is one, the words constitute a syntactical unity. According to those, on the other hand, who hold that a word points to the particular, since the first word itself denotes cows of all colours, viz. white, black and so forth, there will be tautology if the second word, although it does not cease to indicate the connection (of the cow) with 'whiteness',<sup>17</sup> is understood as *intended* to signify it. It should accordingly be explained as negatively qualifying the cow in question or as denying all other colours of it. Hence, alternatively, the import of the sentence is (stated to be)) 'exclusion'.<sup>18</sup> One of the points to be noted here

16 See p. 854 (Benares edition). Kumārila refers to them here for the purpose of refutation.

17 So the aspect of 'inclusion' is not left out. Analogously we may say, as indeed Pārthasārathi himself adds immediately after the passage translated above, that in the first view, 'exclusion' is implicit, the reason being that a sentence (e.g. *Gauḥ śuklaḥ ānīyatām*), when taken in its practical context, must necessarily refer to an *individual* as in the second view. See Note 11.

18 Patañjali also explains these two terms under II. i. 1 (p. 364); but, since he is there considering the meaning of compound words and derivatives and not of sentences the explanation is not directly useful for us here. But the principle underlying it is the same. The example *gauḥ śuklaḥ* selected by Pārthasārathi to illustrate both the views may suggest that they apply only to co-ordinate or appositional propositions; but the one, chosen by Patañjali, viz. *rāja-puruṣaḥ* shows that it need not be so.

specially is the meaning of *dravya*. We tentatively took it as equivalent to a particular instance of a class. From the above explanation, it is clear that it stands really for a class; only it means not *all* cows but *any* cow. In the above sentence, the first word denotes the whole class of cows; and the second, the whole class of white things. But when the two are taken as syntactically one they, by mutual restriction, signify neither any cow nor any thing that is white, but any white cow. These explanations of *bheda* and *saṃsarga* correspond to what in modern Logic are described as the class and the attributive views.

It will be seen that these meanings of *bheda* and *saṃsarga* especially of the former, are entirely different from those assigned to them above on the authority of certain Advaitic works. It is difficult to say how the same words came to be interpreted thus differently. We know that there were several views held by Indian thinkers in regard to the import of propositions, as in the case of so many other problems; and the interpretation in question probably goes back to a view different from those alluded to by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas.

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